What central banks can learn about default risk from credit markets by Marsh, I. W.
Marsh, I. W. (2002). What central banks can learn about default risk from credit markets. In: Market 
functioning and central bank policy (BIS Papers No 12). . Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International 
Settlements. ISBN 92-9131-636-9 
City Research Online
Original citation: Marsh, I. W. (2002). What central banks can learn about default risk from credit 
markets. In: Market functioning and central bank policy (BIS Papers No 12). . Basel, Switzerland: 
Bank for International Settlements. ISBN 92-9131-636-9 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/16804/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 BIS Papers No 12 329
 
What central banks can learn about 
default risk from credit markets 
Ian W Marsh,1 Bank of England 
1. Introduction 
The benchmark source of information from the credit markets is the credit spread, usually expressed 
as the difference between the yield offered on defaultable bonds and the yield on default-free bonds. 
Versions of this spread, and simple transformations of it, are used within central banks in at least three 
ways: 
The assessment of default probabilities. The raw credit spread is used in the assessment of the 
financial stability conjuncture and outlook as an indicator of credit risk. Absent taxation asymmetries 
between corporate and default-free bonds, the textbook treatment of corporate bonds assumes that 
some corporate bonds will default and that investors require a higher yield to compensate for expected 
default losses (see, for example, Bodie et al (1993)). We demonstrate below how expected default 
probabilities can be extracted from credit spreads. 
The assessment of market functioning. The dispersion of credit spreads on equally rated individual 
names or sectors is used as one of several indicators of the efficient functioning of credit markets. For 
example, a widening of spreads of A-rated bonds of a particular group of issuers relative to other 
A-rated corporates might be indicative of credit rationing were it also observed that issuance of new 
bonds by those issuers was low. The dispersion of the spreads reveals information about the influence 
of sectoral versus macroeconomic shocks. The dispersion can also indicate the ability of the market to 
differentiate creditworthiness. This is of interest if “unwarranted” contagion is suspected. 
As a leading indicator of macroeconomic developments. Gertler and Lown (2000) suggest that the 
high-yield credit spread has been a superior leading indicator of the US business cycle. They argue 
that competing spreads (term spread and paper-bill spread) have lost explanatory power due to 
changes in monetary policy while the credit spread is a good and stable proxy for the premium for 
external funds which is central to financial accelerator models. Cooper et al (2001) is a recent 
application from a central bank perspective. 
The remainder of this paper will focus on the first of these uses. In particular, we compare the 
information content of credit spreads with that of the relatively new credit default swap (CDS) market. 
We show that, theoretically, both corporate bond and default swap prices are formed from the same 
raw information. Indeed, the market practice is to base default swap prices on the credit spread 
although it is recognised that prices in the two markets are in two-way dynamic equilibrium. We 
demonstrate that analysis of the two markets should yield the same information. However, we also 
consider the imperfections of the credit markets and show why these may drive a wedge between 
CDS prices and credit spreads. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline the credit default swap market. Section 3 
demonstrates that theoretically this market should contain no additional information to that contained 
in credit spreads. However, it also highlights and attempts to explain the divergence between 
information on default probabilities extracted from default swap and bond markets. Section 4 draws 
some conclusions. 
                                                     
1
 Anne-Marie Rieu very generously gave me permission to use her work on this topic, and I draw on this widely. I am also 
grateful to Alex Bowen, Jean-Sebastien Bret, Simon Hayes and David Rule for valuable comments. Unfortunately I must 
remain responsible for any errors. The views expressed are those of the author. 
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2. Introduction to credit derivatives 
The simplest instrument traded under the title of credit derivatives is the single name credit default 
swap. In a credit default swap, one counterparty (the “protection seller”) agrees to compensate 
another counterparty (the “protection buyer”) if a particular company or sovereign (the “reference 
entity”) experiences one or more defined credit events. The protection seller is paid a premium, usually 
expressed as an annualised percentage of the notional value of the transaction, over the life of the 
transaction. 
A CDS is often compared to a guarantee or insurance policy. The key difference is that a guarantee 
would compensate a protection buyer for its losses following a credit event and so is state-dependent 
(there has been a credit event) and outcome-dependent (the buyer has suffered losses), whereas a 
CDS is only state-dependent (compensation is paid by the protection seller irrespective of whether the 
buyer has experienced losses).  
Despite moves to standardise the market, several features need to be defined before the CDS trade is 
executed: 
 The reference entity must be specified.  
 The credit event(s) that would trigger a payment to the protection buyer may include some or 
all of the following non-exhaustive list: 
– bankruptcy; 
– failure to pay; 
– obligation acceleration or default; 
– repudiation/moratorium (for a sovereign reference entity); 
– restructuring of the reference entity’s debt. 
 A reference asset is sometimes specified. This allows the precise specification of the capital 
structure seniority of the debt covered, and can give a better indication of the recovery rate 
after default. 
 The settlement convention following the credit event. The contract is either physical or 
cash-settled. Physical settlement would entail the delivery of the defaulted security to the 
protection seller in exchange for par value in cash. Cash settlement would entail the 
protection buyer receiving par minus the default price of the reference asset in cash (usually 
gathered via a poll of dealers). The default price is market-determined (although a fallback 
arrangement ought to also be included in the documentation should it not be possible to 
market-price the asset).  
3. Information from credit derivatives 
3.1 A theoretical treatment of risky bond prices and credit default swap rates 
In this section we briefly outline a method for the extraction of information from credit default swap 
rates. In parallel we do the same for defaultable bonds to highlight the theoretical linkages between 
the information contained in the two sets of market prices. This section draws heavily on Rieu (2001), 
which contains much greater detail of some steps made in this paper. 
We start with a cash flow analysis. Assume we have a risky bond of maturity Tn, of nominal value 100, 
paying fixed annual coupons C. Should it default, the bond would pay a recovery rate of . Assume 
also that we have a credit default swap with annual premium s. On default, the protection buyer 
receives  of the par value of the reference asset. The cash flows are summarised in the following 
table. Should default occur, of course, only one of the payments in the column headed default is 
received. 
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Bond cash flows to holder CDS cash flows to protection buyer 
Time 
Survival Default Survival Default 
1 C .(100+C) –s 100.(1-) 
2 C .(100+C) –s 100.(1-) 
3 C .(100+C) –s 100.(1-) 
 … … … … 
Tn 100+C .(100+C) –s 100.(1-) 
We assume that the default can only occur on the coupon payment dates or maturity. This simplifies 
the analysis since we do not then have to worry about claims on accrued interest payments for mid-
coupon date defaults. While somewhat unrealistic, Hull and White (2000) show that this assumption 
has little impact on extracted default probabilities. 
The probability of default is time-varying. Define q(0, k, k+1) to be the risk neutral conditional 
probability of default between period k and k+1, and Q(0,Tk) to be the cumulative risk neutral 
probability of default between 0 and Tk. Similarly, define P(0,Tk) to be the cumulative risk neutral 
probability of survival over the same period. 
By Bayes’ Rule we know that the conditional probability of survival between k and k+1 is 
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Define B(0, t) to be the spot price of a risk-free zero coupon bond paying one at time t. The present 
value of the risky coupon bond is then 
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and the credit default swap is priced such that 
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These equations express the present values of both risky bonds and credit default swaps in terms of 
zero coupon risk-free bond prices, conditional probabilities of default and the recovery rate. The 
important issue then is that since the prices of the risky coupon bond and the credit default swap are 
functions of the same recovery rate and default probabilities, the information extracted from both 
should theoretically be equivalent. This result is important. CDS prices are easy to observe directly 
whereas computing credit spreads involves the preliminary step of determining risk-free rates, which 
can be problematic where government bond yields are distorted by regulation or supply shortages 
(see Anderson and Sleath (1999) for a discussion of the Bank of England’s methodology of deriving 
yield curves). Further, while indicative CDS prices are relatively easily available for maturities of three, 
five, seven and 10 years, credit spreads can only be observed at the maturities of outstanding bonds, 
which are sometimes not so widely or evenly dispersed. However, CDS prices are only quoted for a 
subset of reference entities that have issued bonds, and firm CDS prices are hard to find away from 
the most liquid points (typically five years). Being able to use information interchangeably from both 
markets would allow a more comprehensive picture of default risk.  
We now show how to extract the risk neutral conditional probabilities of default from risky bond prices. 
The period t price of a risk-free zero coupon bond is 
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where f(t, Tk) is the continuous-time instantaneous forward rate at Tk seen from t, and R(t, Tk) is the 
risk-free rate over (t, Tk). 
Similarly, the price of a risky zero coupon bond is 
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       tTTtSTtBTtV kkkk  ,exp,,  (3) 
where S(t, Tk) is the credit spread at t for a claim of maturity Tk. 
If we make the usual but critical simplifying assumption of independence between risk-free rates and 
default, then following the model of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) we can define the price of a one-period 
risky zero coupon bond as 
         .1,0,0.1,0,011,01,0 qqBV   (4) 
Similarly, the expected value of a two-period risky zero coupon bond in the Jarrow-Turnbull model is 
                  1,0,02,1,01,0,012,1,011,0,012,02,0 qqqqqBV  (5) 
This assumption of independence is widespread in the literature and Moody’s Investor’s Service 
(2000) provides evidence that the correlations are small enough for this assumption to be warranted.  
Rearranging (3) gives 
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which when combined with (4) gives the conditional default probability between [0, 1] 
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Substitution into (5) yields 
 
     
  
.
1,0exp
22,0exp1,0exp2,1,0



S
SSq  (8) 
This process can be rolled forwards n periods revealing the generalised conditional risk neutral 
probability of default to be 
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and the cumulative probability of default to be 
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That is, we can express the conditional and cumulative risk neutral probabilities of default in terms of 
the observable credit spread and the (ex ante unobservable) recovery rate. The standard financial 
pricing model says: 
 mxEP   (11) 
where P is the price of the asset, m is the stochastic discount factor, x is the payoff of the asset, and E 
denotes conditional expectations. In a state-price density framework we can rewrite this as 
     
s
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where  (s) denotes the true probability of state s. However, if we denote the risk-free rate of interest 
by Rf, the risk neutral probabilities we have extracted (*) are such that 
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The transformation between risk neutral and true probabilities is 
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That is, the risk neutral probabilities give greater weight to states with higher than average marginal 
utility. Since default is likely to coincide with periods of economic downturn, when the marginal utility of 
an extra dollar is higher than average, the extracted probabilities are at best an upper bound on the 
true probabilities of default. Nevertheless, even though they may not be true default probabilities, the 
risk neutral probabilities extracted from the bond market should still equal those from the CDS market. 
Duffie (1999) shows that the credit default swap price should equal the spread over Libor on a par 
floating rate note by arbitrage. He also argues that spreads on par fixed rate bonds and par floating 
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rate notes are essentially equal (to within 1 basis point per 100 basis points of credit spread). Hull and 
White (2000) confirm this result in the presence of a flat (Libor) term structure but show that a steeply 
sloping term structure can lead to an imprecise arbitrage argument (approximately 7 basis points per 
100 basis points of credit spread). Hull and White also examine the effect of using non-par bond 
spreads. They demonstrate that for spreads characteristic of BBB-rated issuers, the error is rather 
small in the presence of a flat term structure (5 basis points per 100 basis points of credit spread).  
We read this literature as suggesting that the credit spread over Libor on fixed rate bonds and the 
CDS price should be (approximately) equal, and hence that either par bond credit spreads or credit 
default swap prices can be used in equations (9) and (10). To obtain true (risk neutral) default 
probabilities, the spread between Libor and the risk-free rate needs to be added to the CDS price and 
credit spread over Libor. Note that this reintroduces the problem of observing the risk-free rate given 
government bond market supply effects referred to above. The implication is that using CDS prices 
does not make this problem go away if the object of the exercise is to compute default probabilities. 
This theoretical equivalence between CDS prices and credit spreads is violated in reality. The 
following section demonstrates the divergence between credit spread curves derived from bond prices 
and CDS rates, and the divergences between inference regarding default probabilities that result. The 
subsequent section considers reasons for the divergence over and above the imprecise arbitrage 
arguments already noted. 
3.2 An empirical example 
As an empirical example, we will consider implied default probabilities for a single company (Citigroup) 
on a given day (2 October 2001) derived from quoted bond and credit default swap prices.  
Credit default swap prices. These were available for annual maturities between one and 10 years from 
the JP Morgan website. JP Morgan is a leading market-maker in credit default swaps. The prices are 
indicative middle-market rates. Firm bid and ask quotes are available from the same site for three-, 
five-, seven- and 10-year maturities. The additional information from the indicative prices makes them 
more attractive for our purposes. As noted above, CDS prices are a spread over Libor. Fair 
comparison against a (bond) credit spread over risk-free rates implies adding the Libor-risk-free 
spread to the CDS price at each maturity.  
Risky bond prices. Middle-market prices on all Citigroup US dollar-denominated bonds were collected 
from Bloomberg. Only straight fixed coupon bonds with no embedded options were considered. Bonds 
with a maturity of less than one year were dropped since such short-dated bonds are infrequently 
traded and prices are likely to be either stale or misleading. If, for any given maturity, more than one 
bond was quoted, we took the price of the bond with the largest amount outstanding, all other things 
being equal. We did not exclude bonds priced far from par since this would have excluded too many 
bonds for subsequent optimisation (the furthest departure was a clean price of 109.5). Despite 
choosing a large player in the debt markets, we only found six suitable fixed coupon bond spreads. 
The implied zero coupon spread of the risky bonds over the risk-free zero coupon curve was then 
computed for each bond. 
Default probabilities. A parametric curve of the form s = a + b.t + c.t2 (where t denotes maturity and s is 
the spread over the risk-free rate) was fitted to both sets of spreads. Conditional and cumulative 
default probabilities were then calculated as in equations (9) and (10) with a recovery rate of 40% 
assumed. 
Figure 1 reveals the raw spread data being analysed. The bond data are well dispersed by maturity, 
yet the tight grouping of three bonds around four years reveals a wide disparity of spreads.2 The 
10-year bond spread also appears out of alignment. The CDS spreads, while appearing smoother, 
also show some idiosyncracies. The lower cost of five-year protection relative to four-year reflects the 
concentration of CDS liquidity around the five-year horizon. The other “jumps” in CDS spreads are 
largely driven by jumps in the Libor-risk-free spread. 
                                                     
2
  Duration effects can account for some but not all of this disparity. At least part of the remainder is due to relative liquidity. 
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Figure 1 
Observed CDS and bond spreads over risk-free rates 
Figures 2 and 3 reveal the different profiles of default probabilities extracted from the two markets. 
Cumulative and especially conditional probabilities are markedly different, even for a company such as 
Citicorp that is relatively creditworthy (Aa2/AA- rating at time of quotes), and has a reasonably active 
portfolio of bonds outstanding capable of providing yields over a wide spread of maturities. The 
differences in inference are robust to alternative functional forms for the spread curve and alternative, 
plausible, recovery rate assumptions. In the next subsection we discuss reasons why the two markets 
provide conflicting information. 
3.3 Why bond spreads and credit default swap spreads may diverge 
Define the swap basis to be the CDS price minus the par bond spread. Although the two components 
should be equal in theory, even in perfect markets there could be a non-zero swap basis. O’Kane and 
McAdie (2001) split the reasons into two groups. They term the first group “fundamental” factors and 
argue that these arise because of the simplifying assumptions made when describing the credit default 
swap and risky bond. The main elements in this group are: 
 Funding issues. Trading in the bond is a funded transaction where the funding rate depends 
upon the credit rating of the market participant. Credit default swaps are unfunded and lock 
in an effective funding rate of Libor. Highly rated investors (or investors with natural funding 
such as pension funds and retail banks) may fund sub-Libor, which would lead them to 
prefer to buy the bond rather than sell protection. Conversely, lower-rated investors wishing 
to acquire credit risk would prefer the unfunded CDS transaction. Obviously, the exact 
circumstances of market participants will determine the effect this has on the swap basis. 
O’Kane and McAdie (2001) assert that most participants fund above Libor, which tends to 
narrow the basis since they will be willing to accept a lower CDS spread to obtain the funding 
advantage. 
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Figure 2 
Cumulative risk neutral default probabilities 
Figure 3 
Conditional risk neutral default probabilities 
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 Counterparty risk. After settlement, the purchase of a bond is free from counterparty credit 
risk. A credit default swap is a bilateral transaction, which does entail counterparty risk. 
Protection buyers face by far the greater proportion of this risk and hence will pay a lower 
rate than in the absence of counterparty risk. This also tends to narrow the swap basis. 
Jarrow and Yu (2001) provide a method of pricing CDS subject to counterparty risk. 
 The delivery option in a physically settled CDS. As mentioned above, it is possible that the 
protection buyer in a CDS contract has a choice of which exact asset to deliver to the seller. 
While in theory all equally senior assets issued by the reference entity should trade at the 
same price following a credit event (since bondholders of pari passu assets have equal 
claims to company assets), this does not always occur in practice if the event is less than 
“full default” (defined to be when all obligations become immediately due and payable). The 
delivery option may be potentially valuable in this situation and this should increase the swap 
basis. Recent changes to the ISDA documentation on credit swaps relating to restructuring 
have reduced the value of this option. 
Other reasons for the swap basis not being equal to zero are grouped under the heading of “market” 
factors. These can be further separated into liquidity and demand and supply factors. 
 Liquidity factors. The relative liquidity of the bond and CDS markets is very different. But the 
difference is not systematic across maturities. Typically, the CDS market is most liquid at the 
five-year maturity, followed by the three-year then 10- and one-year points. The bond market 
is usually liquid wherever on the yield curve the largest outstanding notional amounts lie. Not 
only is this likely to be at different maturities for different issuers, but it will shift over time for 
a given issuer as the bonds age. 
 Demand and supply factors. It is sometimes claimed that the majority of participants in the 
single name CDS market are risk-takers that want to sell protection (O’Kane and McAdie 
(2001)). Financial institutions have a comparative advantage in assessing and managing 
credit risk, and this is most cleanly done by selling CDS contracts. This preponderance of 
“technical shorts” puts downward pressure on the swap basis.  
The other side of the coin is that shorting a credit can be difficult in bond markets since the 
supply of bonds on repo is often limited. Market-wide sentiment against a credit will raise the 
credit spread of that entity’s bonds and its CDS rate. But the difficulty of shorting the bond 
may cause the latter to rise by more, and hence the swap basis increases.  
New issuance in the bond or loan markets leaves banks and underwriters long credit, 
leading them to buy protection via CDS either to reduce exposure or to free up regulatory 
capital. While the increased supply should make shorting the bond easier, market 
participants argue that the demand effect dominates and so the net effect is that the basis 
again widens. 
It is of interest to examine whether the observed divergences between CDS prices and credit spreads 
demonstrated in Section 4.2 can be explained by fundamental factors, or whether there are serious 
discrepancies between the two markets. For example, after controlling for fundamental factors, a 
widening of the swap basis for financial institutions in liquid markets may be indicative of rising fears 
about general counterparty risk. 
There are reasons why the two markets may be separated. Participation in the CDS market is limited 
to relatively highly rated entities due to the counterparty risk inherent in the swap. However, the bond 
market is a cash market. It is possible that the more constrained CDS market prices less information, 
or at least prices it more slowly, than the bond market. However, it is worth mentioning that CDS 
dealers view the basis as an indicator of credit pressure, given that commercial banks have better 
information about creditworthiness. They see a widening basis for an individual name, ceteris paribus, 
as a leading or, at least, current indicator of credit deterioration as informed banks take positions in the 
CDS market that are subsequently priced into bond spreads, reversing the supposed pricing 
efficiency. 
Apportioning the differences between CDS prices and credit spreads econometrically is hampered by 
the fact that several of the factors mentioned are difficult to proxy. Essentially, all of the fundamental 
factors need contract-specific or transaction-specific information. Fortunately, the directions of the 
impacts of these factors are either indeterminate or partially offsetting. Rieu (2001) contains some 
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initial work in explaining the swap basis for France Telecom in terms of liquidity and demand/supply 
factors which we now summarise, highlighting areas where further work is needed. 
The market factors are more amenable to econometric investigation. Rieu (2001) uses three proxies 
for relative liquidity: 
 Maturities quoted. Traded volume is not available for either the CDS or the bond markets. 
Instead the number of different CDS and bond prices actively quoted each day is used as a 
proxy. Typically, the higher the liquidity in the two markets, the more bonds/CDS maturities 
are quoted. The indicator used is simply the number of CDS prices minus the number of 
bonds quoted on any given day, a rising number indicating relatively more liquidity in the 
CDS market. 
 Bid-ask spreads. A more liquid market is usually associated with a tight bid-ask spread. This 
is just one dimension of liquidity, but it has the clear advantage that it is the easiest to 
observe. The indicator used is relative spreads (CDS minus bonds), with rising numbers 
indicating lower relative liquidity in the CDS market. This indicator was maturity-specific 
since relative spreads could be computed for different maturities. 
 Deviation of observed prices from theoretical levels. Following Monkkonen (2000), the 
difference between the largest and smallest absolute deviation of observed bond yields from 
the fitted yield curve is computed. Similarly, the difference between the largest and smallest 
absolute deviation of CDS prices from the CDS curve is calculated. The indicator used is the 
CDS difference minus the bond difference. Again, a higher number would be indicative of 
lower relative CDS market liquidity.  
Finally, a credit protection demand indicator is included. An obvious factor likely to lead to an 
increased demand for protection is industry downgrading by credit rating agencies. The sample period 
considered runs from October 2000 to February 2001. The first wave of telecoms downgrades is in the 
middle of this sample. Rieu (2001) computed a simple indicator that increased (decreased) by unity 
every time a European telecoms company was downgraded (upgraded), but which decayed towards 
zero as demand pressures were satisfied in the credit markets. An increase in the demand indicator 
would suggest an increase in the swap basis as credit protection is more easily acquired by buying 
protection in the CDS market than by shorting the bonds.  
Rieu (2001) applies a fixed-effects panel estimation procedure to the daily swap basis between curves 
fitted to France Telecom CDS prices and credit spreads over several maturities, using the above four 
independent variables. The model has to explain large time series changes (the swap basis moves 
between zero and 100 basis points during the sample) and cross-sectional variation (the term 
structure of the swap basis altered significantly during the sample, with the basis for longer maturities 
becoming much more positive than for the short end).  
Key findings from the regressions include: 
 All four explanatory variables are highly significant with the expected signs. The third liquidity 
factor (relative divergence from the theoretical spread curves) is statistically and 
economically the most important of the liquidity factors. 
 Over 77% of the variance of the swap bases at various maturities is explained by the four 
variables. 
 The fixed-effects terms indicate relative bond market liquidity at horizons between two and 
three years and in excess of five years. The CDS market is relatively more liquid below two 
years and around the five-year mark. This accords with the perceived liquidity rankings 
across maturities in the CDS market noted above. 
These initial results highlight the importance of considering the impact of market conditions on the 
default probabilities extracted from either credit spreads or CDS prices. The swap basis for the single 
name considered by Rieu (2001) reached one percentage point during an admittedly volatile period for 
credit markets. However, a large proportion of the basis can apparently be explained in terms of 
liquidity and supply/demand imbalances.  
Further work is needed to examine whether a similar picture emerges for other reference entities (we 
are applying similar tests to rates on leading banks), and whether some of the other factors detailed 
above are important in explaining the swap basis. In particular, we will address the supply side of the 
credit market. We noted above that new bond issuance by the reference entity (or a similar entity if 
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cross-hedges are employed) increases the supply of shortable bonds but also increases the demand 
for protection. Incorporating new bond and debt issuance will allow us to test the dominance of one 
over the other. 
4. Summary 
The academic literature suggests that the credit default swap price should almost exactly equal the 
credit spread on par floating rate notes. Since par floating rate notes are rare, par fixed rate bonds 
provide a reasonably accurate alternative. Since par fixed rate bonds are not common, non-par fixed 
rate credit spreads are often used as an alternative. This paper has shown how expected default 
probabilities can be extracted from either credit spreads or CDS prices. We have also shown that the 
two probability profiles can be substantially different. 
There are fundamental reasons why the relationship between CDS prices and non-par fixed rate credit 
spreads are not exactly equivalent. These are recognised by academics and market participants. For 
example, focusing on one key reason for a deviation, Scott (1998) notes: 
“The market convention for pricing new default swaps is to take the credit spreads in the bonds of the 
reference entity and adjust up or down depending on the expected financing rates for the bonds.”  
We have also described market conditions that will drive a wedge between the credit spread and CDS 
price. Further, we have presented preliminary research that suggests that, for one prominent reference 
entity, the majority of the, sometimes large, observed deviations could be explained by relative liquidity 
and demand factors.  
Some potentially important factors remain unmodelled. The ongoing research project will attempt to 
incorporate these factors and more fully account for the difference between CDS prices and credit 
spreads for a wider selection of names. Accounting fully for the swap basis could allow CDS and credit 
spread data to be pooled, giving a fuller picture of default expectations across a wider range of 
horizons.  
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